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Abstract 
This paper is the first to decompose absolute global income inequality into its within-country 
class and between-country location components. The estimates show that until 1970 
locational income differences were the main driver of absolute global inequality, whereas its 
recent growth can be explained primarily by class differences. Nowadays, inequality between 
classes explains 70% of absolute global market inequality. Additional findings are that absolute 
income convergence between countries took place after 2005, that it is possible to reduce 
absolute inequality and to grow at the same time, and that of late within countries net inequality 
was growing faster than market inequality. 
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1. Introduction 
Existing research suggests that income inequality can have adverse effects on social justice and 
economic growth (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Sen, 2000; Picket and Wilkinson, 2010; Herzer 
and Vollmer, 2012; 2013; Halter et al., 2014; Onaran and Galanis, 2014; Kumhof et al., 2015), 
and of late the popular perception that globalization is not leading to “a rising tide that lifts all 
boats” is growing. Accordingly, politicians, academics and the media frequently state that 
inequality is one of the biggest challenges of our time and that the topic demands much more 
attention (Obama, 2011; Krueger, 2012; Minton Beddoes, 2012; Shiller, 2012; Stiglitz, 2012; 
Lagarde, 2013; Piketty, 2015). 
Empirical studies that examine the global evolution of income inequality almost exclusively 
concentrate on relative inequality (e.g. Milanovic, 2005; 2013; Sala-i-Martin, 2006; Piketty, 
2014; van Zanden et al., 2014). However, inequality can also be measured in absolute terms. 
Contrary to relative inequality, absolute inequality depends on changes in the absolute 
differences of income between citizens or countries, and can widen even though proportionate 
income difference stay constant. If, for example, the income of the whole population increases 
by the same percentage relative income differences stay constant but the gap in absolute 
monetary terms grows.1 
Several authors argue that the focus on relative inequality is unduly restrictive (Ravallion, 
2004; Svedberg, 2004; Atkinson and Brandolini, 2010, Bosmans et al., 2014; Anand and Segal, 
2014). Surveys show that people often refer to absolute income differences when they talk about 
inequality (Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo, 1993; Harrison and Seidel, 1994; Amiel and Cowell, 
1999) and there is “little obvious reason for assuming that it is the relative inequalities in 
incomes (rather than absolute inequalities) that matter instrumentally to valued social outcomes” 
(Ravallion, 2004, pg.19). Indeed, differences in perceptions in part explains why conflicting 
views about the distributional outcomes of globalisation exist depending on whether people 
refer to absolute or relative inequality they claim that globalisation leads to less or more 
inequality (Ravallion, 2004; Atkinson and Brandolini, 2010). Moreover, previous studies suggest 
                                                            
1 Suppose that a country has two citizens that have an income of $1,000 (A) and $100,000 (B). If the income of both 
grows by 10%, the new income of citizen A is $1,100 and that of citizen B is $110,000. The proportional income 
difference between the two stayed constant (B has still 100 times more income than A) but the absolute gap between 
the two incomes increased by $9,900. 
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that absolute inequality (i) increases the tendency that crimes are committed, given that the 
expected value of delinquency increases (Fleisher, 1966; Ehrlich, 1973), (ii) augments the 
potential lobbying power of the elites and therefore is likely to influence democratic decision 
processes (see Esteban and Ray, 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Gilens and Page, 2014), 
and (iii) affects the demand for assets and thus influence their prices (Froud et al., 2001; Goda 
and Lysandrou, 2014).2 
The few papers that present data about absolute income changes unanimously report a sharp 
increase in between-country and global inequality.3 Pritchett (1997, p.11) reports that the average 
difference between the GDP per capita of the seven richest countries and that of least developed 
countries increased from around 1,000 to around 11,500 constant international dollars between 
1870 and 1990, and Bosmans et al.’s (2014) estimates suggest that this trend continued between 
1990 and 2005. With regard to global inequality, Dikhanov and Ward (2002, Table 2) show that 
the absolute income difference between an average person in the bottom and top decile grew 
from around 19,000 to around 29,000 between 1970 and 1999. This finding is in line with 
Atkinson and Brandolini’s (2010) and Anand and Segal’s (2014) estimations, which demonstrate 
that absolute global inequality increased continuously between 1820 and 2005. 
To date, no absolute inequality study has measured within-country inequality trends on a 
global scale. It is therefore not clear if the reported increase in absolute global inequality was 
mainly driven by growing inequalities within or between countries. The mayor aim of our paper 
is to show how absolute global within-country and between-country inequality evolved during 
the period 1850 to 2010, to close this gap in the literature. Moreover, this is the first absolute 
inequality study that compares changes in net and market inequality4 and that takes different 
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates into account. 
As pointed out by Anand and Segal (2014, pg.1), the decomposition of global inequality is 
important as it “is at least a necessary precursor to any causal explanation because one would 
expect different mechanisms to explain the two components”. A further reason why such a 
                                                            
2 Please note also that, from a technical point of view, absolute indices are as good inequality measures as relative 
indices (see Kolm, 1976). 
3 When inequality is measured across countries three concepts are typically used: within-country, between-country 
and global inequality. The first concept refer to inequalities within the border of a country, the second concept to 
differences in the GDP per capita between countries, and the third concept to worldwide inequalities between 
individuals irrespective of their country of residence. 
4 Market income is pre-tax and pre-transfer income, while net income considers tax payments and transfer receipts. 
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decomposition is of interest is that it shows whether global inequality is mainly driven by income 
differences between ‘locations’ or between ‘classes’. Between-country inequality can be called 
“‘locational’ because it depends on the differences of mean incomes between various places 
(countries), and the within inequality, ‘class’ inequality because it depends on different 
individuals, living in the same country, having different incomes” (Milanovic, 2012a; pg. 127).5 
This distinction has important policy implications: if one intends to reduce global inequality 
migration would be a very efficient policy when inequalities between locations mainly explain 
global income differences (Milanovic, 2012a, 2013), whereas redistribution between rich and 
poor citizens would be the best policy option when inequality is mainly driven by class 
differences. 
Our findings provide evidence that until 1970 locational income differences were the main 
driver of absolute global inequality, whereas most of its recent growth can be explained by class 
income differences. In 2010 the class component explained 70% of absolute global market 
income inequality and around 60% of absolute global net income inequality. Additionally, we 
find that absolute income convergence between countries took place after 2005 (for the first time 
since 1850), that it is possible to reduce absolute inequality and to grow at the same time, and 
that within countries net inequality was growing faster than market inequality between 1995 and 
2010. These results are robust regardless of the PPP exchange rate used. 
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section two gives details of the model specification and 
the data used. Section three presents and discusses the estimation results. Section four concludes. 
 
2. Model specification and the data used 
An inequality index 𝐼𝐴: 𝑅 → 𝑅
1 is an absolute index if it stays constant when all incomes 
change by the same absolute amount (Chakravarty, 2001; Chakravarty and Tyagarupananda, 
2009). That is, for all 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 and for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅𝑛: 
                                                            
5 The term ‘class’ often is used to distinguish between social groups, like workers, capitalists, managers, rentiers, 
proletariat, ruling class, etc. The justification to use the term class as synonym for income classes is that “the 
concept of class [is also widely used to describe] a collection of individuals sharing similar economic 
circumstances” (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2015). 
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 𝐼𝐴
𝑛 = 𝐼𝐴
𝑛(𝑥 + 𝑐1𝑛) (1) 
where 𝑐 > 0 is any scalar and 1 is a vector of ones of dimension 𝑛. 
Atkinson and Brandolini (2010) and Anand and Segal (2014) use the Absolute Gini Index to 
measure changes in absolute global inequality.6 This inequality measure fulfils the Symmetry 
property (SYM), the Population Principle (POP), the Normalization property (NOM), and the 
Principle of Transfers (POT)7. Additionally, it is has the advantage that it transforms in the most 
widely used relative inequality measure —the Gini Index— when it is normalized by the mean 
income. 
The Absolute Gini Index is not Subgroup Decomposable (SUD) though. To satisfy SUD an 
index needs to report values that are completely decomposable into within-group and between-
group inequality. Given that we want to decompose global inequality into its within- and 
between-country components this property is very important for our purpose. According to 
Chakravarty (2001) and Chakravarty and Tyagarupananda (2009), an absolute inequality index 
(𝐼𝐴) that fulfills the SUD property can be expressed as follows: 
 𝐼𝐴
𝑛(𝑥) = ∑ 𝜔(𝑛, 𝜆)𝐼𝑛𝑖(𝑥𝑖)𝑘𝑖=1 + 𝐼
𝑛(𝜆11
𝑛1 , … , 𝜆𝑘1
𝑛𝑘) (2) 
where 𝑘 ≥ 2 denote the number of subgroups used; 𝑛𝑖 is the population size associated with the 
distribution 𝑥𝑖, 𝑛 = ∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 , 𝜆𝑖= mean of distribution 𝑥𝑖, 𝜆 = (𝜆
1, 𝜆2 … 𝜆𝑘), 𝑛 = (𝑛1, 𝑛2 … 𝑛𝑘) 
and 𝜔𝑖(𝑛, 𝜆) is the positive weight attached to inequality in 𝑥𝑖, assumed to depend of 𝑛 and 𝜆. 
The first part of Equation 2 represents within-group inequality and the second part between-
group inequality. 
To estimate the level of inequality between individuals around the globe it is crucial to take 
countries’ population sizes into account (which means that 𝜔𝑖(𝑛, 𝜆) =
𝑛𝑖
𝑛⁄ .). Hence, an index 
also needs to be Population Share Weighted Decomposable (PSD) to be suitable for our purpose. 
                                                            
6 Anand and Segal (2014) also use the absolute Theil L and Theil T index. Both indices report the same trend 
changes as the absolute Gini index. 
7 SYM means that the index is invariant to the reordering of incomes. POP means that the value of the index does 
not depend on the population size. NOM means that the index is non-negative and that it has the value of zero only 
under the condition that all incomes are equal. POT means that an index reports decreasing inequality when a 
transfer of income from a rich person to a poor person occurs (when this transfer does not change the relative 
income position of the two persons). 
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Chakravarty (2001) and Chakravarty and Tyagarupananda (2009) demonstrate that the only 
absolute inequality index that satisfies PSD, SYM, NOM and POT is a positive multiple of the 
variance: 
 𝐼𝑉
𝑛(𝑥) =
1
𝑁
∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝜆)
2𝑛
𝑖=1  (3) 
The variance can be seen as a special case of the class of absolute decomposable indices of 
inequality as it attaches equal weight to a transfer from a rich to a poor person at all income 
positions (Bosmans and Cowell, 2010).8 The variance also has the advantage that it is easy to 
compute because its components are independent of each other.9 Hence, the variance is the most 
suitable inequality measure for our purpose, and the specific form of our absolute global 
inequality index is: 
 = ∑
𝑛𝑖
𝑁
(
1
20
∑ ((𝑥𝑖𝑝 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖) − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖)
220
𝑝=1 )
𝑘
𝑖=1 +
1
𝑁
(∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑤)
2𝑘
𝑖=1 ) (4) 
where 𝑘 is the number of countries included in the measure, 𝑛𝑖 denotes the population size of the 
i-th country, 𝑁 = ∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1  is the global population, 𝑥𝑖𝑝 is the income share of the p-th population 
ventile10 of the i-th country, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 is the total income of the i-th country; 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖 the mean (per 
capita) income of the i-th country and GDPpcw the mean income of the world, weighted by 
population. The first part of this index shows class inequality and the second part locational 
income differences. 
To estimate the second part of Equation 4, we put together a dataset that contains each 
country’s constant GDP per capita in PPP11 and population size. Due to data availability this 
dataset is based on two series: one historical series for the period 1850 to 1980 and one recent 
series from 1980 to 2010. The data are retrieved from Maddison Project’s (2013) database and 
                                                            
8 Technically speaking, the variance is a special case of the class of absolute decomposable inequality measure when 
the real number associated at the index is c=0 see Bosmans and Cowell (2010) for a demonstration. 
9 This means that the variance is the absolute counterpart of the Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD), which is the 
only relative inequality index that satisfies the PSD property (see Shorrocks, 1980). 
10 Ventile shares are frequently used in the literature as they allow for relatively exact inequality estimates when 
income differences within income share groups are not taken into account (see Davies and Shorrocks, 1989; 
Milanovic, 2012). Each population ventile represent 5% of the population. The ordering and grouping of the 
population takes place according to their income (the lowest ventile represents the poorest 5% of the population 
etc.). Please note that our results are robust when decile or quintile shares are used instead of ventile shares. 
11 It is a common procedure among global inequality studies to use GDP per capita in PPP and not in market 
exchange rates (see Anand and Segal (2008) for a discussion of the reasons). 
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World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). To ensure relative consistent estimates 
between the historical and recent data series, most of our analysis in the next section is based on 
Maddison Project’s GDP per capita data in 1990 PPP. Additional reasons to concentrate mainly 
on these data are that the 2005 PPP estimates have been heavily criticized (see e.g. Deaton and 
Heston, 2010; Breton and García, 2015), and that the new 2011 PPP estimates apparently are 
relatively similar to the pre-2005 estimates (see Deaton and Aten, 2014). To check for the 
robustness of our results when different PPP exchange rates are used, we also present estimates 
using 2005 and 2011 PPP exchange rates (see Section 3.3). 
To calculate the within-country component we also need income shares for each country (see 
part one of Equation 4). Unfortunately, for most countries these data are not readily available. To 
solve this issue, we follow van Zanden et al. (2014) to calculate the income shares of the p-th 
percentile (𝑥𝑖𝑝): 
 𝑥𝑖𝑝 = 𝛷(𝛷
−1(𝑝𝑖𝑗) − σ𝑖) (5) 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of income12 and 𝜎𝑖 the standard deviation of 
the Gini coefficient of each country and year under study. 
The standard deviation is calculated as follows: 
 𝜎𝑖 = √2𝛷−1 (
1+𝐺𝑖
2
) (6) 
where 𝐺𝑖 is the Gini coefficient. Please note that that this method produces estimates that overall 
fit the ‘real’ data very well (see Appendix). 
The Gini coefficients for the historical series were kindly provided by Bas van Leeuwen and 
are based on the paper van Zanden et al. (2014). At the time of writing this dataset was not only 
the broadest available but also the one that presented the most consistent estimates of historical 
Gini coefficients. Van Zanden et al. (2014) report market income Gini coefficients in 20 year 
intervals for the period 1850 and 1950 and in five year intervals afterwards. Given that not for all 
                                                            
12 We use a lognormal distribution because “the literature suggests that when the whole distribution is covered, the 
log-normal is to be preferred [and] on average the difference between an assumed log-normal and a Pareto 
distribution [is] limited” (van Zanden et al., 2014, pp.4-5 of their data appendix; see also Soltow (1998) and Lopez 
and Servén (2006)). 
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countries data are available in five year intervals, we use ten year intervals between 1950 and 
1980 to maximize the number of countries that have data for all years under consideration. 
The Gini coefficients for the recent series were retrieved from Solt’s Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (2013, version 4.0). This database is widely used and has 
the advantage that it “provides comparable Gini indices of gross and net income inequality for 
153 countries for as many years as possible [and therefore] is better suited to broad crossnational 
research on income inequality than previously available sources” (Solt, 2009, pg. 231). Given 
that the SWIID does not provide data for every country in each year, we are using a five-year 
benchmark methodology that is similar to Milanovic’s (2005; 2012b) approach.13 
Table 1 summarizes the data availability and the data sources. The available data are very 
unbalanced: the minimum amount of countries for which population, GDP per capita and Gini 
data are available is 32 (year 1850) and the maximum amount is 140 (year 2005). If one would 
use the whole sample for the estimates, the results could be influenced by the inclusion/exclusion 
of different countries in different years. We therefore base our main estimates on a core group of 
29 countries14, for which all data are available in all years15. This core group of countries is very 
representative —on average, it represents 76% of the global population and 88% of the global 
GDP— but is handicapped by the non-inclusion of African countries. However, our overall 
results are not affected by this shortcoming (see Section 3.3). 
  
                                                            
13 When Solt’s database reports a Gini coefficient for a country in a benchmark year this coefficient is taken for that 
year. Otherwise, we are using either the Gini coefficient that was reported one year before or one year after the 
respective benchmark year; or, when data for both are available, the simple mean of the these two Gini coefficients. 
14 Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States. 
15 To ensure a maximum amount of core countries we imputed some data (see Table A3 in the Appendix). 
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Table 1: Data sources and number of countries with available data 
 
Note: This table shows the number of countries for which population data, GDP per capita data in 1990 PPP, and 
Gini coefficients are available. The last column shows the number of countries that have data for all of the three 
variables. 
All three inequality concepts that are discussed in the next section global, within- and 
between-country income inequality are normalized by the value of the global variance of 1990 
in 1990 PPPs (i.e. around 112 million), in order that the sum of the within-country and between-
country indices equals the global inequality index number. It is important to note that the 1980 
values of the indices that are calculated with the historical or the recent data series are nearly 
identical (see Figure 1 in Section 3.1). The within-country and the global inequality values are 
slightly higher when the recent data series is used (by 3.2% and 1.4% respectively), and the two 
data series practically lead to the same between-country inequality value.16 This similarity not 
only allows us to analyse the whole period without the need to take into account a break but also 
suggests that our results are robust when market Gini coefficients from different sources are 
used. 
  
                                                            
16 The recent and the historical series are so identical because (i) both series use the same GDP per capita data (from 
Maddison), (ii) the population data from Maddison and WDI are very similar, and (iii) the market Gini data from 
van Zanden et al. (2014) and from the SWIID are also relatively similar in many cases. 
Year All three variables
# countries source # countries source # countries source # countries
1850 67 Maddison 44 Maddison 47 van Zanden 32
1870 90 Maddison 72 Maddison 67 van Zanden 46
1890 52 Maddison 50 Maddison 76 van Zanden 36
1910 90 Maddison 72 Maddison 89 van Zanden 45
1929 67 Maddison 59 Maddison 91 van Zanden 41
1950 165 Maddison 152 Maddison 91 van Zanden 81
1960 165 Maddison 152 Maddison 97 van Zanden 86
1970 165 Maddison 166 Maddison 103 van Zanden 97
1980 165 / 210 Maddison/WDI 152 Maddison 87 / 89 van Zanden/SWIID 79 / 75
1985 210 WDI 152 Maddison 99 SWIID 76
1990 212 WDI 169 Maddison 124 SWIID 113
1995 212 WDI 168 Maddison 142 SWIID 128
2000 214 WDI 168 Maddison 150 SWIID 132
2005 214 WDI 168 Maddison 154 SWIID 140
2010 214 WDI 125 Maddison 105 SWIID 85
GDP per capita (1990 PPP)    Population   Gini   
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3. The historical development of absolute global inequality 
3.1. Absolute market income inequality 
The solid lines in Figure 1 show that absolute global market income inequality has grown 
continuously since the start of the industrial revolution, with an especially stark increase after 
1950. In the first one hundred years of our sample the average annual growth rate of absolute 
global inequality was 3.0%, while it was 4.3% between 1950 and 2010. This figure also shows 
that this growth was driven by both within-country (dashed lines) and between-country 
inequality (pointed lines). 
Figure 1: Evolution of absolute global market income inequality, 1850–2010 
(Index; 1 = global variance of 1990) 
 
Note: This figure shows the historic evolution of absolute market inequality for a group of 29 core countries, taking 
into account GDP per capita in 1990 PPPs. The grey lines show the estimates based on the historical data series 
and the black lines are calculated with the recent data series (see Table 1 for the data sources). 
During the period 1870 to 1970 locational income differences were the most important driver 
behind the increase in global income differences. In 1870 one-fourth of absolute global 
inequality was resulting from mean income differences between countries, while this figure rose 
to around 50% in 1970 (Figure 2). After 1970 the importance of location started to decrease 
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again, with the result that in 2010 location ‘only’ explained around 30% of absolute global 
market inequality. 
It is also important to note that for the first time since the beginning of the industrial 
revolution absolute income convergence between developing and developed countries took place 
between 2005 and 2010 (Figure 1). Two developments explain this absolute convergence 
process. On the one hand, many rich countries experienced a decline in their per capita income as 
a result of the financial crisis of 2008 (e.g. US, UK, Italy, Spain, Denmark, and Ireland); and, on 
the other hand, many relatively poor and populous countries had relatively high GDP growth 
rates during this period (e.g. China, Russia, Thailand, Brazil, India and Indonesia). 
Figure 2: The composition of absolute global market income inequality, 1850–2010 
 
Note: This figure shows how much percent of absolute global market income inequality arose due to income class 
differences (within-country inequality) and locational income differences (between-country inequality). The 1850-
1970 estimates are based on the historical data series, and the 1980-2010 estimates on the recent data series. 
In contrast to between-country inequality, absolute within-country inequality increased 
especially during the last three decades (Figure 1). To be more precise, between 1980 and 2010 
the weight of the within-country component of absolute global inequality increased by around 
20%-points, with the result that nowadays around 70% of global market income differences 
between individuals can be attributed to inequality between classes (Figure 2). This percentage is 
similar to that of the beginning of our sample period, where around three-fourths of absolute 
global inequality is explained by class differences. 
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Figure 1 also shows that between 1929 and 1950 absolute within-country inequality decreased 
(around -8%). The reason for this decrease was a strong decline in relative inequality in most 
countries —in around 60% of the core group countries the Gini coefficient declined by more 
than 5 points. At the same time the average GDP per capita growth was relatively strong 
(population weighted GDP per capita grew by around 22% between 1929 and 1950), which 
means that during this period most of the countries experienced inclusive growth in absolute 
terms.17 This finding is surprising, given that previous studies claim that under normal 
circumstances absolute inequality will only fall when GDP growth figures are very low or 
negative (Ravallion, 2004; Anand and Segal, 2014). 
All of these findings stand in stark contrast to the conclusions of studies that use relative 
inequality indices when measuring global market income inequality trends (e.g. Bourguignon 
and Morrisson, 2002; Milanovic, 2005; 2013; Sala-i-Martin, 2006; Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin, 
2009; Piketty, 2014; van Zanden et al., 2014). These studies typically make the following claims: 
(i) global inequality has grown sharply between 1820 and 1950, and stayed relatively flat or even 
declined afterwards;18 (ii) population weighted between-country inequality increased strongly 
between the mid of the nineteenth century and the mid of the twentieth century but started to 
decline afterwards; (iii) within-country inequality registered a downward trend between 1929 
and the 1970s and an upward trend afterwards; and (iv) nowadays location differences are much 
more important to explain global inequality than income class differences.19 The discrepancy 
between our findings and those from relative inequality studies suggests that statements about 
global inequality should include a clarification if absolute or relative inequality is meant. 
  
                                                            
17 An obvious caveat in this observation is that two world wars took place during this period. 
18 Some studies report a slight increase of global inequality in recent decades (e.g. Milanovic, 2005, 2013; van 
Zanden et al., 2014), while other studies report a significant decline (e.g. Sala-i-Martin, 2006; Pinkovskiy and Sala-
i-Martin, 2009). See Anand and Segal (2008) and Goda (2013) for an in-depth discussion about the reasons for these 
inconclusive results. 
19 Van Zanden et al.’s (2014) estimates show that in the year 2000 around 70% of relative global inequality could be 
explained by between-country inequality, and Milanovic (2012a, pg.125) finds that nowadays “more than 80 per 
cent of [relative] global income differences is due to large gaps in mean incomes between countries”. 
13 
3.2. Absolute net income inequality 
Given that (especially developed) countries have redistributive policies, absolute within-
country inequality trends could be different when net income shares instead of market income 
shares are used net income shares take tax and transfer payments into account. Indeed, Figure 
3a shows that absolute net within-country inequality estimates are around 70-80% lower than 
that of market inequality.20 However, our main interest is the trend change of absolute inequality 
as the exact value of the variance has little meaning. Figure 3b shows that between 1980 and 
1995 absolute market inequality was growing faster than net inequality within countries, whereas 
afterwards absolute net inequality was growing faster (during the whole period, market income 
inequality grew around 3.3-fold, while net inequality grew around 3.5-fold). This finding 
suggests that taxes and/or transfer payments became less progressive after 1995. 
Figure 3: Absolute market and net income inequality within countries, 1980–2010 
   a. Index (1 = global variance of 1990)              b. Growth rates 
    
Note: Figure 3a compares the development of absolute market and net inequality within countries. Both indices are 
normalized with the value of the global market income variance of 1990 (in 1990 PPPs). Figure 3b shows the 5-
yearly growth rates of the two indices. 
The fact that net within-country inequality is lower than market within-country inequality 
means that the importance of class differences is lower when absolute global inequality is 
measured with net income shares.21 Accordingly, in 1980 ‘only’ around one-third of global net 
                                                            
20 Net income inequality can only be calculated with the recent data series due to data availability. 
21 Between-country inequality is not affected when net income shares instead of market income shares are used (see 
part two of Equation 4 in Section 2). 
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income differences could be attributed to class inequality. However, this figure increased to 58% 
in 2010 (Figure 4). The finding that in 2010 class income differences explained most of both 
absolute global net and market income inequality indicates that redistribution would the most 
efficient policy option if one would like to reduce the actual levels of absolute global inequality. 
Figure 4: The growing importance of class to explain absolute global net inequality 
 
Note: This figure shows how much percent of absolute global net income inequality arose due to income class 
differences (within-country inequality) and locational income differences (between-country inequality). 
 
3.3. Robustness of the results 
It is important to check if the estimates change when different PPP exchange rates are used. 
The impact of PPP exchange rates on absolute inequality is not clear a priori. To our best 
knowledge, absolute inequality studies have not yet tested for the effect of different PPP 
exchange rates. Existing relative inequality studies find that estimates that use GDP per capita in 
2005 PPP instead of 1990 PPP are higher because the 2005 PPP estimates led to a downward 
revision of GDP figures in many populous developing countries (Milanovic, 2012b; van Zanden, 
2014). We are not aware of global inequality studies that use 2011 PPP exchange rates for their 
calculations, but Deaton and Aten (2014) find that this new round of PPP estimates is undoing 
many of the changes of the 2005 round with the results that the “world in 2011 looks sharply 
more equal than previously calculated” (pg.2). Having said this, the fact that our absolute 
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inequality estimates differ significantly from the existing relative estimates suggests that the 
changes in PPP exchange rates might have different effects in absolute than in relative terms. 
Table 2 clearly indicates that the trend changes of within-country, between-country and global 
inequality are very similar regardless of the PPP exchange rate used. The major differences are 
that (i) with 2005 PPP the increase of within-country and global inequality is less steep between 
2005 and 2010 (in fact it is nearly zero when net Gini coefficients are used), and (ii) the 
estimates that are based on 2011 PPP exchange rates are, on average, around 10% higher than 
those calculated with 1990 PPP. The latter finding is surprising, given that the 2011 PPP round is 
expected to lead to lower relative inequality figures (as mentioned above). The reason for why 
the 2011 PPP exchange rates lead to higher absolute inequality is that the latest PPP round 
resulted in an upward revision of the GDP of many rich countries, which, on average, was higher 
in absolute terms than the upward revision of poor countries’ GDP. 
As last robustness check, we are estimating the change in absolute global inequality with the 
full unbalanced sample. The results suggest that the values and the trend changes are very similar 
irrespective of whether the unbalanced sample (Figure 5) or the balanced sample (Figure 1) is 
used. The main distinction is that the unbalanced sample does not show an absolute convergence 
process between 2005 and 2010. This distinction might arise from the inclusion/exclusion of 
different countries in different years in the unbalanced sample. We therefore estimate between-
country inequality for a balanced sample of 160 countries including many African countries 
for the years 1980 to 2010 (i.e. we estimate only the second part of Equation 4).22 The results of 
this exercise confirm our finding of absolute convergence. To be more precise, these estimates 
demonstrate that absolute income differences between countries decreased by around 5% 
between 2005 and 2010 (Figure 6).23 
  
                                                            
22 For this calculation only GDP per capita and population data are needed, which are available for many more 
countries in each year than the Gini coefficients. 
23 This finding is in line with Bosmans et al. (2014) results. Bosmans et al. show that absolute between-country 
inequality increased during the period 1980 to 2009. However, they only find evidence for an increase between 1980 
and 2005, while their estimates suggest that absolute inequality decreased afterwards. 
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Table 2: The evolution of absolute market and net income inequality on a global scale 
 
Note: This table shows the estimates for our 29 core group countries. The post-1970 estimates are based on the 
recent data series. All estimates are normalized with the value of the global market income variance of the year 
1990 (in 1990 PPPs) see Table 1 in Section 2 for the data sources. 
  
Intra-country Inter-country Global Intra-country Inter-country Global Intra-country Inter-country Global
1850 0.006 0.002 0.008
1870 0.013 0.004 0.017
1890 0.015 0.009 0.023
1910 0.038 0.018 0.056
1929 0.086 0.035 0.121
1950 0.079 0.070 0.149
1955 0.095 0.092 0.188
1960 0.120 0.108 0.228
1965 0.166 0.155 0.321
1970 0.196 0.208 0.404
1975 0.247 0.248 0.495
1980 0.309 0.315 0.625 0.314 0.350 0.663
1985 0.382 0.365 0.747 0.384 0.407 0.792
1990 0.548 0.452 1.000 0.553 0.511 1.065 0.598 0.517 1.115
1995 0.727 0.476 1.203 0.709 0.547 1.255 0.786 0.557 1.343
2000 0.981 0.609 1.590 0.964 0.693 1.657 1.056 0.698 1.754
2005 1.196 0.641 1.838 1.133 0.752 1.885 1.236 0.755 1.992
2010 1.342 0.573 1.915 1.234 0.687 1.922 1.370 0.673 2.044
Intra-country Inter-country Global Intra-country Inter-country Global Intra-country Inter-country Global
1980 0.180 0.315 0.496 0.182 0.350 0.531
1985 0.217 0.365 0.583 0.218 0.407 0.625
1990 0.298 0.452 0.750 0.295 0.511 0.806 0.322 0.517 0.839
1995 0.393 0.476 0.869 0.371 0.547 0.918 0.415 0.557 0.972
2000 0.542 0.609 1.151 0.505 0.693 1.199 0.572 0.698 1.270
2005 0.693 0.641 1.334 0.609 0.752 1.361 0.682 0.755 1.438
2010 0.805 0.573 1.378 0.673 0.687 1.360 0.778 0.673 1.451
Market income inequality index
Net income inequality index
1990 PPP 2005 PPP 2011 PPP
1990 PPP 2005 PPP 2011 PPP
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Figure 5: Evolution of absolute global market income inequality, unbalanced sample 
(Index; base = global variance of 1990) 
 
Note: This figure shows the historic evolution of absolute market inequality for the full unbalanced sample. The grey 
lines show the estimates based on the historical data series and the black lines are calculated with the recent data 
series (see Table 1 for the data sources). 
 
Figure 6: Absolute between-country inequality estimates for 160 countries  
(Index, base year 1990) 
 
Note: This graph shows the evolution of population weighted between-country inequality for a balanced sample of 
160 countries, based on their GDP per capita data in 2005 PPPs from the WDI. 
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4. Conclusions 
This paper examines the historical development of absolute income differences more 
thoroughly than previously done. The results demonstrate that absolute global inequality has 
grown continuously since 1850, with an especially stark increase from the middle of the 
twentieth century onwards. Before 1970 the growth of absolute global inequality was mainly 
driven by between-country inequality (location), while most of its recent growth can be 
explained by a sharp increase in within-country inequality (class). In 2010 class differences 
explained 70% of absolute global market income inequality, and around 60% of absolute global 
net income inequality, which means that nowadays class differences explain nearly as much of 
global income differences as in 1850 (at least in market income terms). 
These findings challenge the often made claims that global inequality has decreased during 
the last decades (Sala-i-Martin, 2006; Pinkovskiy, and Sala-i-Martin, 2009), and that locational 
income differences explain most of global inequality (Milanovic, 2012a; 2013). While these 
claims might be correct with regard to relative income inequality, they are not correct with 
regard to absolute income inequality. One should therefore abstain from general statements on 
inequality trends without clarifying if relative or absolute inequality is meant. The same is true 
for policy advices regarding the reduction of global inequality. At the moment, migration would 
probably be the best option if on would like to reduce relative inequality, while redistribution 
would be the most efficient policy option to reduce absolute inequality. 
Additional novel findings of this paper are that (i) it is possible to reduce absolute inequality 
and to grow at the same time when countries initially have high levels of relative inequality (as it 
was the case between 1929 and 1950); (ii) net inequality within countries was growing faster 
than market inequality after 1995, which suggests that taxes and/or transfers became less 
progressive; and (iii) the financial crisis of 2007-09 contributed to an absolute convergence of 
income between developing and developed countries (for the first time since the industrial 
revolution). All of these findings are robust when different PPP exchange rates are used. 
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Appendix 
 
 
The goodness of fit of the income share estimation methodology used 
To check the robustness of our method to derive income shares (Equations 5-6 in Section 2), 
we calculate income shares with Gini coefficients from the WDI database and compare these 
estimates with readily available income share data from the same database. WDI reports Gini 
coefficients and quintile income shares for 155 countries. The available data are very unbalanced 
(881 out of 5,115 possible observations between 1980 and 2012), we therefore use a benchmark 
year methodology (see Footnote 12) to calculate income shares for the years 1985, 1990, 1995, 
2000, 2005 and 2010 (352 out of 930 possible observations). 
Table A1 shows that the correlation between WDI’s readily available income shares and our 
estimated shares is close to one (with the exception of Quintile 4), and Table A2 demonstrates 
that the average difference between the values of our estimated shares and the readily available 
shares is relatively small. However, our methodology consistently underestimates the two bottom 
quintile shares, overestimates the shares from Quintile 3 and 4, and underestimates the top 
quintile share. To check if this difference has an impact on the level and/or trend of absolute 
inequality estimates, we calculate the level of absolute within-country inequality for a core group 
of countries24 (66 observations) for which WDI quintile share and Gini data are available in each 
benchmark year. 
Figure A1 shows that the correlation between these two inequality series is very close to one. 
This result suggests that our method produces income share estimates that overall fit the ‘real’ 
data very well and that they do not influence trend changes. It is important to note, that the 
calculated shares lead to a slightly higher level of absolute inequality (around 1%) than the 
readily available WDI shares. This means that our income share estimation methodology might 
lead to a slight overestimation of absolute inequality levels.  
                                                            
24 Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Poland, Tunisia. 
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Table A1: Correlation matrix of the calculated and the original income shares 
 
Note: The first column refers to the reported quintile shares from the WDI database and the first row refers to our 
calculated income shares. 
 
Table A2: Average differences between the calculated and the original income shares 
 
Note: The first row of each quintile share reports our calculated mean income share, the second row shows the 
mean income share reported by WDI, and the third row shows the differences between our calculated share and the 
reported share. 
  
x _Q1 x _Q2 x _Q3 x _Q4 x _Q5
WDI_Q1 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.85 -0.96
WDI_Q2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.91 -0.99
WDI_Q3 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.93 -0.98
WDI_Q4 0.75 0.79 0.81 0.83 -0.80
WDI_Q5 -0.98 -0.99 -0.99 -0.93 1.00
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
calculated 0.059 0.055 0.053 0.056 0.055 0.057
original 0.062 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.060 0.062
Difference -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005
calculated 0.103 0.098 0.097 0.100 0.099 0.101
original 0.104 0.100 0.099 0.102 0.101 0.103
Difference -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
calculated 0.151 0.145 0.145 0.147 0.147 0.149
original 0.149 0.145 0.143 0.146 0.145 0.147
Difference 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
calculated 0.223 0.220 0.220 0.220 0.221 0.223
original 0.215 0.212 0.209 0.212 0.209 0.212
Difference 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.012 0.011
calculated 0.464 0.483 0.485 0.476 0.479 0.470
original 0.469 0.486 0.491 0.480 0.485 0.476
Difference -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006
Observations 22 35 72 81 81 61
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
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Figure A1: Absolute within-country inequality estimates based on the WDI data 
(Index, base year 1990) 
 
Note: This graph shows absolute within-inequality estimates based on the calculated and the original WDI income 
shares for those 11 countries for which data are available in each year. 
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Overview about data imputations made 
To prevent that imputations affect our main findings, we have not imputed more than two 
years of data per variable and country. For the imputation of GDP per capita we have used 
regional averages because this approach is widely used in the existing literature (see e.g. Sala-i-
Martin, 2006). Please see Table A3 for an overview of the imputations made. 
Table A3: Overview of the data imputations made for core group countries 
 
Note: This table shows all imputations that we have made to increase the size of our core country group to 29 
countries. 
GDP per capita Population Gini coefficient
Colombia 1850
Country's Gini coefficient in 
1870 adjusted with the growth 
rate of Argentina's, Chile's and 
Peru's Gini coefficients 
between 1850-1870.
Ireland 1850, 1890
Country's GDP per capita of 
1870 adjusted with the region's 
growth rate between 1850-
1870 and between 1870-1890.
Peru 1850
Country's GDP per capita of 
1870 adjusted with the region's 
growth rate between 1850-
1870.
Philippines 1850, 1890
Country's GDP per capita of 
1870 adjusted with the region's 
growth rate from 1850-1870 
and from 1870-1890.
Poland 1850
Country's GDP per capita of 
1870 adjusted with the region's 
growth rate between 1850-
1870.
Russia
1850, 1870,
1910
Country's GDP per capita of 
1890 adjusted with the region's 
growth rate between 1870-
1890 and between 1850-1870.
The population size from 1913
was taken for the year 1910.
Switzerland 1850
Country's GDP per capita of 
1870 adjusted with the region's 
growth rate between 1850-
1870.
Thailand 1850
Country's GDP per capita of 
1820 adjusted with the region's 
growth rate between 1820-
1850.
Short description of imputation method
Country Missing years
